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Abstract: This article examines the content, contexts and issues in the 
ECOWAS 2020 Transformational Vision with the goal of outlining the 
prospects for its actualization. Following an extensive review of extant 
literature on regional integration as well as relevant studies on regional 
integration in West Africa, the article argues that that as long as the 
structures that, in the last four decades, have worked to frustrate the 
ECOWAS’ goal of an integrated community are still alive and active, the 
2020 Transformational Vision, though an ambitious agenda, going by the 
philosophical ideas undergirding it, like similar ideas and visions of the 
distant and recent past, is likely to be unrealizable. It concludes that the 2020 
Vision should be viewed as another ‘development tokenism’ by the sub-
region’s statesmen and policymakers to appease radical voices in the sub-
region and not really as an attempt to democratize regional development.  
 
Keywords: development, regional integration, transformational vision, sub-
region, ECOWAS  
 
Introduction
  
In the 1960s, Africa joined the rest of the Third World to key into the 
global wave of regionalization which had emerged in Europe in May 1951. 
Resultantly, what developed across the different sub-regions of the continent, 
especially in the 1970s, were myriads of regional integrative outfits, initiated 
and promoted by leaders, to surmount the numerous challenges confronting 
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their countries.1 In the West African sub-region, after three years of 
meticulous planning and diplomatic activities, an all-embracing regional 
integrative outfit, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), was established on 28 May 1975 with the grand objective of 
promoting co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity.2 
During the first decade of its existence, several activities were embarked 
upon by the institutions of ECOWAS, as well as the member states, to 
achieve the objective of regional integration; yet, the performance of the 
organization seemed to have fallen short of expectations, leading to calls for 
its reinvigoration in the globalizing era.3 
The revised ECOWAS Treaty of 1993 did not only recommend the 
jettisoning of the intergovernmental system enshrined in the 1975 treaty for 
a supranational system, but designated the establishment of a common 
market and a single currency as a matter of urgency.4Interestingly, with this 
institutional transformation, the major stake-holders were, perhaps, 
optimistic that, within the shortest possible time, the dividends of regional 
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1Michael Kehinde, “African Regional Integration: Lessons from the European Union”, in: 
The Constitution, vol. 14, no.1, 2014, p.55. 
2Adebayo Adedeji, “Collective Self-reliance in Developing Africa: Scope, Prospects and 
Problems”, in: Bolaji Akinyemi, Samuel Falegan, Isaac Aluko (eds.), Reading and 
Documents on ECOWAS, Lagos, NIIA/ Macmillan, 1984, p. xxi. 
3 See Kwesi Kufuor, The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of West 
African States, Ashgate, Surrey, 2006. 
4 Babatunde Ajulor, “The Revised ECOWAS Treaty (1993): A Synopsis”, in: Nigerian 
Journal of International Affairs, vol.21, no.1, 1995, p.91. 
RJHIS 4 (2) 2017  
  
 
   
 
155 
 
integration would begin to accrue to the member-states and their citizens. 
Disappointingly, however, in spite of these renewed drives and commitments 
by the stakeholders to ‘fast track’ regional economic integration, it would 
appear that the vision of an integrated community where people and goods 
could move freely without official restrictions still remains a pipe dream as 
some of the objectives of ECOWAS set forth in the founding and revised 
treaties such as trade liberalization, common external tariff and single 
currency have not been achieved.5 
Perhaps this state of affairs might have compelled the sub-region’s 
statesmen to craft a new transformational vision for the organization in the 
first decade of the 21st century. The promoters hope that the new vision, 
adopted by a resolution of the Highest Authority of the organization in June 
2007 and mandated by the same body, to be given the necessary fillip by the 
President of the ECOWAS Commission, if domesticated and implemented 
by the member states, would launch the sub-region on the path of an 
integrated economic community. However, as it is today, barely three years 
to 2020, there are no convincing indicators that the much-publicized vision 
is likely to be a reality. Why? This is the core problem of this article. 
Specifically, this article engages the issues and contentions in the ECOWAS 
2020 Transformational Vision. Following this introduction, which presents 
the article’s significance and purpose, is section two which provides the 
                                                          
5 Charles Ukeje, “From Economic Co-operation to Collective Security: ECOWAS and the 
Changing Imperatives of sub-Regionalism in West Africa”, in: Williams Fawole, Charles 
Ukeje (eds.),The Crisis of the State and Regionalism In West Africa: Identity, Citizenship 
and Conflict, Dakar, CODESRIA, 2005, p.142; See ECOWAS Executive Secretary’s Annual 
Report, Abuja, ECOWAS, 2009, p. 3. 
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theoretical framework for the discourse. This is followed by an examination 
and discussion of the background to and content of the ECOWAS 2020 
Transformational Vision. It goes on to highlight the seeming achievements 
and challenges of ECOWAS. The article also undertakes a prognosis of the 
prospects of achieving Vision2020 and concludes with a number of 
submissions.  
 
Theoretical Framework of Analysis  
 
The starting question of our theoretical discourse in this article is: 
which model of regional integration does the ECOWAS Transformation 
Vision 2020 seek to promote? This is against the backdrop of the fact that the 
discourses on regional integration in international relations has been framed 
by divergent theoretical perspectives. However, it has to be stressed that, not 
until recently when the issue of bringing the support of the “people” into the 
regional integration project gained currency, debates about regional 
integration, since the end of the Second World War, have been shaped by two 
States-centred theoretical perspectives: the federalist and functionalist.6 
The federalist (supra-nationalist) perspective celebrates the 
superintendent of states’ sovereignties, in the long run, i.e. common 
supranational institutions that could co-ordinate the co-operative efforts of 
                                                          
6 Sean Dosenrode “Federalism Theory and Neo-Functionalism: Elements for an Analytical 
Framework”, in: Perspectives on Federalism, vol. 2, issue 3, 2010, pp. 1–28.  
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all.7 The assumption of this perspective is that collective action problems that 
often confront an anarchical society in the absence of a common power could 
be better managed in a condition where sovereignties, albeit, voluntarily, are 
surrendered to a central institution.8 Specifically, the contention of this 
perspective is that regional integration would be better fast tracked and 
brought to almost a logical conclusion, if sovereignty and nationalism, the 
twin obstacles to regional development, are supplanted by supra-national 
institutions. The second perspective, on the other hand, favours incremental 
approach, to regional integration. According to Mitrany, the pioneer of 
functionalism,  
 
Sovereignty cannot in fact be transferred effectively through a formula, only 
through a function. By entrusting an authority with a certain task, carrying 
with it command over the requisite powers and means, a slice of sovereignty 
is transferred from the old authority to the new, and the accumulation of such 
partial transfers in time brings about a translation of the true seat of 
authority.9 
 
Mitrany’score thesis is that regional integration is better effected 
through the creation of a transnational complex of economic and social 
organization rather than through surrendering of sovereignties. Arguing 
within the same school, Haas posits that the creation of ‘limited’ 
                                                          
7 See Daniel Elazar, Exploring federalism, Alabama, The University of Alabama Press, 
1987; Daniel Elazar, Covenant and Civil Society, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 
1998. 
8 Sharkdam Wapmuk, “In Search of Greater Unity: African States and the Quest for an 
African Union Government”, in: Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, 
vol. 1, no. 3, 2009, p.648. 
9David Mitrany, A Working Peace System. An Argument for the Functional Development of 
International Organization, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943, p. 31. 
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supranational institutions would gradually bring political elites and interest 
groups of the country involved to supporting further integration ventures 
because they see benefit in it for themselves.10 
At this juncture, it instructive to note that though these two broad 
perspectives view regional integration through different lenses, nevertheless, 
both agree that regional integration, rather than the sovereignty-oriented 
framework of development, is the best option for managing the socio-
economic problems confronting a group of States within a region. 
Instructively, both have, for decades, framed the discourses, on regional 
integration among African statesmen and policy makers. Again, it has to be 
stressed that, in some studies on regional integration in Africa, in the last few 
years, another perspective which is a contradiction to the age-long State-
centered perspectives, has gained popularity. To be sure, this emerging 
perspective would seem to have framed the discourse on regional integration 
through the prism of the peoples, the supposed end of regional integration 
project.11As a matter of fact, the advocates of this perspective blame the 
problems of ECOWAS and other regional outfits in Africa on faulty 
theoretical premises drawn from the experience of Europe. Bourenane,12 for 
instance, contends that the idea of copying institutions found in Europe is not 
only a delusion but an obstacle to building a regional community in West 
                                                          
10 Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe, Standard, Standard University Press, 1958, p. 13. 
11See Stanislas Adotevi, “Cultural Dimension of Economic and Political Integration in 
Africa”, in: Real Lavergne (ed.), Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa: A 
Multidimensional Perspective, Ottawa, Africa World Press International, 1995, pp. 16 - 31. 
12 Naceur Bourenane, “Theoretical and Strategic Approaches”, in: Real Lavergne, (ed.) 
Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa: A Multidimensional Perspective, 
Ottawa, Africa World Press International, 1995, pp. 33-47. 
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Africa, as the conditions that promoted integration in Europe are obviously 
not present in West Africa. Against this background, he posits that efforts by 
the policymakers to integrate a region should not be blinded to the needs and 
aspirations of the people of the region in the light of its social and economic 
reality, history and culture. In the light of the foregoing, it might be plausible 
to ask: which perspective does theECOWAS Transformation Vision 2020 
mirrors? We will come to this soon; however, it is imperative to put the 
content and context of the Transformation Vision 2020 in clear perspective. 
 
ECOWAS Transformation Vision 2020: Navigating the Context and 
Content  
 
It must be noted from the onset that the process leading to the 
adoption of the ECOWAS Transformation Vision 2020could, in its remote 
origin, be traced to the late 1980s, when failures in service delivery, spurred 
by the contradictions in the implementation of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme, led to fundamental rethinking of Africa’s development by 
leaders of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). This culminated in the 
UNECA’s sponsored International Conference on Popular Participation in 
the Recovery and Development Process, in Arusha, Tanzania, in February 
1990.13 The conference deliberated, on the relationship between development 
policy, popular participation and decentralization of the State.14 At end of the 
                                                          
13 See Said Adejumobi, “The African Experience of Popular Participation in Development”, 
in: Said Adejumobi, Adebayo Olukoshi (eds.), African Union and the New Strategy for 
African Development, Dakar/Addis Ababa, CODESRIA/ DPMF, 2009, pp. 64 – 81. 
14Ibidem, p. 70. 
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conference, the participants called for the full and effective participation of 
the people and civil society organizations in charting their development 
policies, programmes and processes.15 Indeed, in a forceful tone, the 
delegates declared that ‘Africa has no alternative but to empower its people 
urgently and immediately and failure to do so would cause Africa to become 
further marginalized in world affairs, both geo-politically and 
economically’.16Perhaps, it was against this background that the idea of 
popular participation became a key feature of the continent’s development 
discourse.  
Unfortunately, and disappointingly, too, African statesmen and the 
donor community rather than situating the developmental crisis that 
confronted the continent in the failure of the centralized states and the centrist 
developmental policies that have defined them, insisted on implicating 
external debts and other exogenous factors.17 But, with the newly-found 
awareness, in African governmental circles, in the first decade of the 21st 
century, that development must be centred on the people, efforts began to be 
exerted at multilateral levels to bring back into the regional integration 
discourse the issue of democratic regionalism. In the words of Sesay and 
Omotosho,18 
 
                                                          
15UNECA, African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, 
Arusha, Tanzania, UNECA, 1990, p. 6. 
16Ibidem, p. 5. 
17Adeniyi Basiru, “The African ‘Developmental State’ In The Age Of GlobalAccumulation 
Crisis”, in: Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, vol. 13, no.7, 2011, p. 179. 
18Amadu Sesay, Moshood Omotosho, “The Politics of Regional Integration in West Africa”, 
in: WACSERIES, vol. 2, no. 2, 2011, p. 16. 
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failure by the states in West Africa to significantly improve the lives of their 
peoples after more than 50 years of independence has led to the increasing 
advocacy by development partners, local and international civil society 
organizations, CSOs, to get the citizens fully involved in national development 
processes as countervailing forces to the state. 
 
Perhaps this new thinking might have spurred the arrival of the latest 
ECOWAS blueprint – the Transformation Vision 2020 – adopted by the 
ECOWAS Heads of State in June 2007.19 It might also have influenced the 
decisions of the ECOWAS Commission to prepare the ECOWAS 2020 
Vision Document in 2010.20Specifically, the 2020 agenda is aimed at setting 
a clear direction and goal to significantly raise the standard of living of people 
through conscious and inclusive programmes that will guarantee a bright 
future for West Africa and shape the destiny of the region for many years to 
come.21To achieve this objective by the year 2020, the ECOWAS leaders, in 
2007, based on the experience of the past, in which regional developmental 
efforts were dominated by the states and their agents, were, perhaps, 
convinced that the erstwhile ECOWAS of States paradigm needed to be 
supplanted with a new framework which is people-oriented.22Putting the 
seeming rationale behind the adoption of the new paradigm in perspective, 
Abbey23 remarks,  
 
                                                          
19 ECOWAS, Vision 2020 ECOWAS of the People: Towards a Democratic and Community, 
Abuja, ECOWAS Commission, 2009, p.1. 
20Ibidem, p.2. 
21Ibidem, pp. 3 – 4. 
22Ibidem, p.2. 
23Joseph Abbey, “Regional Integration in West Africa”, in: Modern Ghana News, 7 May 
2011, available at http://www.modernghana.com/print/274624/west-african-regional-
integration-process/, accessed on 4th August 2017. 
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since regional integration is a process rather than a single occurrence, moving 
it in the right direction requires that ―politicians should not prescribe and 
impose issues on the people; rather, people should be part of the decision-
making process to enable them help in the implementation of its policies, since 
neither the region nor its constituent member states are homogenous. 
 
 To be sure, the overall objective of the 2020 agenda is captured in the 
Vision mission statement which reads inter alia: ‘to create a borderless, 
peaceful, prosperous and cohesive region, built on good governance and 
where people have the capacity to access and harness its enormous resources 
through the creation of opportunities for sustainable development and 
environmental preservation’.24 
Here, it is instructive to note that virtually all the major provisions in 
the 2020 Vision Document frame the structural and institutional 
transformation of the sub-region, economically and socially, around the 
people. To be sure, at the level of community, the document projects that by 
2020 the citizens of the sub-region, among other things, will: 
• be living in a developed and integrated West Africa; 
• have a dynamic regional economy driven by a regionally-inclined 
business community; 
• have a highly skilled, flexible and mobile workforce;  
• have affordable and accessible health and educational systems.25 
                                                          
24Ibidem, p.2. 
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Beyond all of these, the Vision Document also imposes some 
obligations on the member-states at national level in order to realize the 2020 
Vision. These are: 
• Each Member State will have a national development policy with a 
strong regional orientation; 
• All ECOWAS countries will show credible evidence of judicial, 
institutional and policy efforts that internalize regional integration in 
their national development strategy; 
• Every country would demonstrably have undertaken the required 
constitutional and administrative measures to entrench regional 
approach; 
• All Member States and their key institutional agencies demonstrate 
the spirit of “ownership” and provide conducive policy space in 
which national development agenda and strategies are designed; 
•  All Member State view the region individually and collectively as a 
mutually dependent economic space.26 
A critical look at the whole document shows that, aside from the 
general objectives, scope and values, the outlined issues of subsidiarity, 
equity, inclusion, representation, participation, accountability etc, the Vision 
Document contains many provisions, running through the many paragraphs, 
that if implemented by the concerned parties, could provide the dividends 
associated with people-centered regional integration. All these cannot be 
comprehensively reviewed within the confines of this article, but the key 
                                                          
26Ibidem, pp.2 – 3. 
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provisions that are germane for the purpose of understanding the issues in 
discourse are highlighted. These are deemed to constitute the five 
Transformational building blocks of the Integrative Development of West 
Africa.27 Specifically, it is envisioned that, by 2020, the following targets 
would have been achieved:  
• an inclusive society achieved through human capital development 
and empowerment; 
• a secure and socially cohesive West Africa devoid of conflicts; 
• a unified region that is integrated into the continental and global 
economic space and governed using the principles of good political 
and economic governance; 
• a single unified regional market with a common currency supported 
by an integrated and efficient financial market and payment 
settlement system;  
• an ECOWAS of people where trade and commerce are conducted 
efficiently and with ease; 
• an ECOWAS of people with a conducive policy environment in 
which the private sector will be the primary engine of growth and 
development.28 
Instructively, the afore-highlighted provisions and others were 
expected, if domesticated and operationalized by state parties and other 
concerned stakeholders, to be the spring board for achieving people-oriented 
                                                          
27Ibidem, pp.8 – 9. 
28Ibidem, pp. 9 – 10. 
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regional community by 2020. In the light of the foregoing, a question is apt: 
how far have these actors journeyed in this project? Answering this question 
is the focus of the next section.  
 
Towards 2020 Transformational Vision: The Bumpy Road 
 
Unarguably, West African statesmen, diplomats and other 
stakeholders, like their counterparts in other regions of Africa, have a good 
record in expressing strong and open commitments to implementing 
developmental visions. As such, the ECOWAS 2020 Transformation Vision 
was therefore no exception. Indeed, since its adoption by the Authority of 
Heads of States of the community in 2007 and the subsequent presentation 
of the base document by the ECOWAS Commission in 2010,29 there has been 
a flurry of socio-economic and diplomatic activities on the parts of the State 
parties, ECOWAS institutions, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and other 
major stakeholders, to move the sub-region towards achieving the objective 
of a borderless region by 2020.30 To be sure, state parties and the institutions 
of the organization, unarguably, even though marginal, have made good 
progress and have established a solid base for improved regional-co-
operation.31 Firstly, and ironically, ECOWAS which was primarily 
established as an economic union has achieved most in the area of conflict 
                                                          
29Ibidem, p.1. 
30Amadu Sesay, Moshood Omotosho, op. cit., pp.17 – 18. 
31J. O. Lokulo-Sodipe and A.J Osuntogun,  “The Quest for a Supranational Entity in West 
Africa: Can The Economic Community of West African States Attain The Status?”, in: PER 
/ PELJ, vol. 16, no.3, 2013, pp.260 – 261. 
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management. ECOWAS, through ECOMOG, aside from its efforts in 
restoring peace to Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, in the last few 
years, deployed diplomacy to deal with recalcitrant sit-tight leaders in the 
sub-region. For instance, recently, the organization successfully resolved the 
Gambian post-election crisis that perhaps would have launched the sub-
region into another round crisis.  
Also, the organization has undergone major transformations and 
establishment of various institutions and mechanisms covering the broad 
range of social, economic and political area of co-operation. The Community 
Court of Justice, established in 2001, has undergone a tremendous 
transformation thereby creating opportunities for easy access to the 
community Court by the citizens. In the words of Bapah,32 ‘ECOWAS is 
today the only organization in Africa that has maintained a regional stance 
on the possibility of arbitration by its Court involving a citizen and a state 
without recourse to exhaustion of national remedies’. Beyond these, in the 
sphere of infrastructural provisions, the organization had made a bit of 
progress. For instance, it established a $500m cross-border pipeline project 
(WAGP) that will transport natural gas from Nigeria to three other ECOWAS 
countries-Ghana, Togo and Benin.33 
It has to be stressed, however, thatin spite of all of these, some of the 
age-long monumental challenges that led to the re-invigoration of the 
                                                          
32Yaya Bappah, “ECOWAS and the Promotion of Democratic Governance in West Africa”, 
in: Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy, vol. 2, no. 1, 2014, pp. 86 – 102. 
33See Emmanuel Bensah, “Thirty Years of ECOWAS: An Appraisal”, Modern Ghana, 24th 
April 2012, available at https://www.modernghana.com/news/391065/from-the-archives-
thirty-years-of-ecowas-anappraisal.html,accessed 16th July 2017. 
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organization in 1993,as well as the launching of the Vision 2020 agenda are 
still daunting as ever thus raising the fear and concerns that the 2020 Vision 
may be another unrealizable dream. Putting this scenario in perspective, with 
an assessment of the balance sheet of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free 
Movement, which came into force in 1981, Sesay and Omotoshosay, 
 
the protocol on free movement of people adopted more than two decades ago, 
and which could have had direct impact on the common citizens if it were 
faithfully implemented by member states, has not had the desired effect of 
facilitating easy movement of peoples, goods and services across the region, 
and that generally, the objective politico-economic situation in West Africa 
has not changed significantly since 1975 when ECOWAS was set up.34 
 
Unarguably, the challenges confronting ECOWAS are legion and 
their elaboration have been object of a wide range of studies35 and as such 
should not detain us here. Notwithstanding these, however, Hammed-
Hammed36 sums up the key challenges, as following:  
• Political instability and bad governance that have plagued many of the 
countries; 
• Weakness of the national economies and their insufficient 
diversification; 
• Insufficient political will exhibited by some member states; 
                                                          
34Ahmadu Sesay and Moshood Omotosho, op. cit., p. 21. 
35See Samuel Asante, The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa: A Decade of 
ECOWAS, Boulder, Westview Press, 1989; Victor Adetula, “The Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) and the Challenges of Integration in West Africa”, in: Joy 
Ogwu, WarisuAlli (eds.),ECOWAS: Mile Stones in Regional Integration, Lagos, Printserve 
Ltd, 2009.  
36Aliyu Hammed-Hammed, “The development of ECOWAS Administration, 1975-2005”, 
in: Joy Ogwu, Warisu Alli (eds.), ECOWAS: Mile Stones in Regional Integration, Lagos, 
Printserve Ltd, 2009, pp.113 – 114. 
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• Bad economic policies in certain cases; 
• Failure to involve the civil society, the private sector and mass 
movements in the process of integration; 
• Defective nature of the international machinery in certain cases.  
 
ECOWAS 2020 Transformational Vision: Issues and Prospects 
 
As briefly remarked in the previous sections, West Africa, like other 
regions in Africa, has not been bereft of regional integrative ideas and 
strategies. However, in spite of these and the numerous development 
strategies that have been put in place, since the launch of ECOWAS in 1975, 
as well as the formation of other regional integrative bodies, by the sub-
region’s leaders, the socio-economic statistics of the area have been 
devastatingly debilitating. In comparative terms, the sub-region is not only 
the poorest region in Africa; it is also among the regions of the world with 
the highest poverty prevalence rate.37 In 2009, for instance, an estimated 60% 
of the sub-region’s 300 million inhabitants lived on less than $1 a day.38 Even 
more worrisome is the quantum of national income devoted by virtually all 
the fifteen members of ECOWAS to import food in order to feed their ever-
growing population, due to their lack of capacities to produce enough food to 
feed their people in spite of fertile soil for agriculture.39 
                                                          
37Ahmadu Sesay, Moshood Omotosho, op. cit., p. 22. 
38 ECOWAS, Vision 2020 ECOWAS of the People, op. cit., p. 4. 
39Ahmadu Sesay, Moshood Omotosho, op. cit., p. 22. 
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 In the light of the forgoing, a question is apt: any prospect for the 
realization of the 2020 Transformation Vision against the background of the 
foregoing realities? We will examine this in the paragraphs below. However, 
it has to be stressed that foretelling any developmental programmes is often 
a daunting task. This is more so for regional blocs like ECOWAS, which, as 
remarked earlier, is yet to make any significant impact on the lives of the 
ordinary citizens in the sub-region. These notwithstanding, our thesis is that, 
given the socio-economic and political realities on ground in virtually all the 
countries in the sub-region, coupled with the subpar performance of 
ECOWAS, its institutions and the member-states, with regard to meeting 
targets, achieving the goal of a borderless, peaceful, prosperous and cohesive 
region, built on good governance, as envisioned in the ECOWAS2020 
Transformation Vision, like other numerous visions and projects of the not-
distant past, might be unrealizable. Specifically, this may not be unconnected 
with the fact and realities that some of the factors and forces that have 
individually and collectively worked against previous efforts at achieving the 
goal of an integrated sub-region are not only still at play but are not likely to 
disappear in the near future. 
 The first of such factor pertains to continual lack of commitment by 
the sub-region’s political leadership to the overall objective of the 
ECOWAS.40 Reinforcing this viewpoint, Sesay and Omotosho remark, 
‘many regional leaders profess open support for economic integration under 
the auspices of ECOWAS, very often it is so mainly at the level of rhetoric 
                                                          
40 See Oji Umozurike, Introduction to International Law, Ibadan, Spectrum Books Limited, 
2006, p. 231. 
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as their actions sometimes betray their true commitment to the regional 
integration ideal’.41Instructively, this tendency often manifests at three 
levels. In the first instance, member states often fail to make a contribution 
to the organization as scheduled. Indeed, this situation became so critical that 
the organization had to devise a way out by adopting a Protocol instituting 
5% of tax on all products imported from non-ECOWAS countries.42 Even at 
that, the responses of the members to the Protocol has not been very 
impressive, just as there have been problems with the collection and 
remittances of the levy by some member states to ECOWAS’ account.43 
Interestingly, apart from the low appetite of member States to 
contribute to the organization’s purse to support its projects, the lack of 
commitment to the ideals of ECOWAS manifests through the lackluster 
attitude in ratifying and implementing decisions reached by the highest 
decision-making organ of the organization, its member states. Most times, 
decisions reached on behalf of the community are often seen as constituting 
threats to national sovereignty and as such, reneged upon by member States. 
The ratification of the Protocol Relating to the Free Movement of Persons, 
Residence and Establishment (A/P.1/5/79) is a case in point here. After the 
agreement had been officially signed by all countries, abolishing visas and 
other entry permit requirements, the citizens of the community, thereafter, 
are still subjected to harassment at the various borders within the sub-region.  
                                                          
41Ahmadu Sesay, Moshood Omotosho, op. cit., p. 9. 
42 J. O. Lokulo-Sodipe, A. J. Osuntogun, op. cit., p. 258. 
43Aliyu Hammed-Hammed, op. cit., p. 116. 
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Also connected to lack of commitment to overall goal of ECOWAS 
by the leaders is the issue of divided loyalty of member states which are also 
loyal to other organizations within the sub-region. To be sure, multiple 
memberships of the rival organizations in the last few decades had raised 
issues of primary allegiance and conflicting loyalties not to mention the 
problems of overlapping, incompatible and potentially conflicting 
objectives.44More so, multiple sub-regional groupings also add to the work 
of harmonization and coordination and thus, complicate the eventual fusion 
of regional economic communities into larger regional groupings.45 
Reinforcing the above contention, Adedeji, situates the rivalry between 
ECOWAS and UEMOA thus:  
 
So successful has UEMOA check-mated and undermined ECOWAS that all 
that the latter now spends a great deal of its time doing is to harmonize its 
programmes with those of the former hold joint ministerial meetings, seek the 
convergence of the economic and financial policies and the harmonization of 
the legal framework, accounting procedure and statistics of both ECOWAS 
and UEMOA. In any case, such convergence will for long remain a pipedream 
since UEMOA countries now constitute a majority of ECOWAS member 
countries and as such can play both judge and jury. In spite of the apparent 
unity that exists, ECOWAS is a home divided against itself.46 
 
The second factor is, perhaps, hinged on the fact that ECOWAS lacks 
the requisite supra-national institutions, like the EU, to achieve its 
                                                          
44Adebayo Adedeji, “ECOWAS: A Retrospective Journey”, in: A. Adebajo, and I. Rashid (eds.), West 
African Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled, Region, London, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2004, p. 40. 
45UNECA, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa I, Addis Ababa, UNECA, 2003, p.18. 
46 Adebayo Adedeji, The Role of the Private sector in the Economic integration of the West 
African sub-region, keynote address at the 40th anniversary of the Nigeria Association of 
Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mine and Agriculture, 16 August 2000, p.13. 
Adeniyi S. Basiru 
Olusesan A. Osunkoya 
RJHIS 4 (2) 2017 
 
   
 
172 
 
objectives.47As regional integration is, really, beyond the realm of nation-
states, it requires robust supra-national institutions to provide the framework 
for efficiency. More so, the international system within which integration 
takes place is devoid of the institutions of government available within 
nation-states. To this end, state-like institutions are needed to drive the 
integration processes internationally. Putting this in context, Cheong48 avers 
that ‘supranational institutions represent a community of nations that could 
develop into federal systems or confederations and be great facilitators of 
integration’. Unfortunately, ECOWAS, beyond the formalism of supra-
nationalism, enshrined in the 1993 revised Treaty, has no supra-national 
institution that could effectively implement decisions, particularly those 
relating to some of the provisions enshrined in the Vision 2020 document.  
Till date, infrastructural challenges are as real within the West 
African sub-region as they were about four decades ago. To be sure, road, 
railways and civil aviation systems, the key drivers of regional integration in 
Europe and North America, are still too rudimentary to support integration 
objectives. Specifically, the transport and communication systems are still so 
disjointed that it is often difficult to move goods and persons between 
countries. For instance, it is, perhaps, easier to connect Accra and London or 
Abidjan and Paris by air than it is to connect Accra with neighbouring 
Abidjan.49Again, it is observed that countries in the sub-region have different 
                                                          
47J. O. Lokulo-Sodipe, A. J. Osuntogun, op. cit., p. 266. 
48Sam C. Cheong, “Establishing Supranational Institutions: European Lessons for a 
Unified Korea”, in: East Asian Review, vol. 1, no. 2, 2004, p. 73. 
49J. O. Lokulo-Sodipe, A.J. Osuntogun, op. cit., p. 270. 
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rail gauges making it impossible for trains to move from one country to 
another. Furthermore, the current pattern of water transportation favours 
trans-continental trade. The combination of these continues to hamper intra-
community trade within the sub-region.50 
Another significant factor which has impinged on the regional 
integration process in West Africa and has continued to persist is the 
continued dependent orientation of the economies of ECOWAS member 
states towards the developed countries of the North. As Sesay and Omotosho 
note, ‘West Africa‘s trade and aid dependence on the traditional Northern 
development partners have remained virtually the same since the 
achievement of independence more than five decades ago’.51 More 
worrisomely, virtually all countries are still dependent on budgetary 
augmentation from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), in order to meet their development needs. The 
implication of this state of affairs, in the last four decades, is that West 
African countries are unable to exploit the complementarities of big and 
strong economies and are equally incapable of competing effectively within 
the global economy.52 
Equally important to be stressed is the fact that the democratic space 
in West Africa, in spite of the on-going democratization processes, is 
constricted, making the prospect of institutionalizing people-oriented 
                                                          
50 Daniel Omoweh, “ECOWAS, Infrastructural Development and the NEPAD Initiative”, 
in: Joy Ogwu, Warisu Alli (eds.), op. cit., pp. 207 – 224. 
51Ahmadu Sesay, Moshood Omotosho, op. cit., p. 7. 
52Adeniyi Basiru, “Extra-African Powers and the Crisis of Regionalism in Africa: 
Background to and Reflections on France’s Engagement with Africa”, in: Africa Review, 
vol.8, no.2, 2016, pp. 96 – 107. 
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regionalism somehow bleak. Indeed, in spite of the adoption and ratification 
of the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance 
by member states, there have been, in these countries, though in different 
degrees, documented cases of democratic infractions – human rights abuses, 
executive lawlessness, press censorships, electoral manipulation, 
exclusionary practices; all of which tend to threaten peace not only within the 
countries concerned but the entire sub region.53 For instance, the cancer of 
tenure elongation of incumbent presidents beyond the constitutionally-
mandated two terms, which started in 2001, when the Guinean President, 
Lansana Conte, stage-managed a referendum that extended his tenure beyond 
two terms, has spread to other countries – Togo (2002), Burkina Faso (2008) 
and Gambia (2009). The end of this practice might not be in sight, as the 2013 
and 2015 episodes in Senegal and Togo clearly suggest.  
To be sure, one sector in which the antithesis in the practice of liberal 
democracy in the sub-region has been more manifest is the electoral 
processes. Indeed, the situation appeared so grave that many observers, even 
doubt if elections could, ever, be mechanism for power transitions.54 Every 
stage of the electoral cycle, especially when the incumbent President is an 
interested party, as was the case in the early period of independence, is 
usually characterized by electoral fraud and massive violence perpetuated by 
the incumbents against the oppositions. Most times, such state of affairs often 
                                                          
53 Alexander Frempong, Monitoring Democratic Governance within ECOWAS: The Theory 
and Practice, in: Joy Ogwu, Warisu Alli (eds.), op. cit., pp. 124 – 125. 
54 Adigun Agbaje, Said Adejumobi, “Do Votes Count? The Travails of Electoral Politics 
in Nigeria”, in: Africa Development, vol. XXXI, no. 3, 2006, p.32. 
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threaten the positive peace of the countries concerned. For example, the 
violence that characterized the 2010 presidential election in Cote D’Ivoire 
was so massive that the international community has to intervene to save the 
country from implosion. Even where the pre-election process was not marked 
by violence, there were still, given the illiberal environments in which 
elections are held, high expectations of monumental violence that may arise 
from incumbents’ manipulations of the electoral process in order to hang on 
to power. The ECA report in 2009 notes that, ‘the quality of elections remains 
suspect in many countries. Often, they are less a peaceful means of 
transferring power than a trigger of conflict’.55 
At this juncture, it must be stressed that while the foregoing issues are 
no doubt real and offer explanatory frameworks for why the goal of real 
regional integration continues to be illusive, our contention is that they cannot 
be divorced from the character of the post-colonial African states.56Though 
structurally and territorially weak, the African post-colonial states offer 
almost limitless opportunities for their custodians to deploy the states’ 
awesome powers for the purpose of primitive accumulation within their 
territories.57Framed this way, it may then be posited that preserving the 
existing West African territorial state structures, from internal threats and 
external surrendering of sovereignties is of core value to the West African 
                                                          
55  UNECA, African Governance Report (AGR) II, New York, UNECA/ Oxford 
University, 2009, p.3. 
56See Sina Kawonishe, “Metamorphosis of the OAU to AU: Problems and Prospects”, in: 
African Journal of International Affairs and Development, vol. 7, no.1, 2002. 
57Claude Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa, Ibadan, Spectrum book Ltd, 2001, 
pp.5 – 7. 
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ruling elites. Given this reality, it might be safe to posit that as long the states 
in Africa remain the central actors in the processes of capitalist accumulation; 
their custodians are likely to continue safeguarding them from being 
supplanted. Consequently, it may be argued that, beyond the rhetoric of 
occasional declarations and pronouncements by African statesmen at 
summits envisioning a borderless region, lie the hidden force of elites’ self-
preservation. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
 
This article has examinedthe content, contexts and issues in the 
ECOWAS 2020 Transformational Vision with the goal of outlining the 
prospects for its actualization. In furtherance of this objective, it presented 
the theoretical framework, reviewed extant literature on regional integration 
in West Africa. Most importantly, it analyzed the key provisions in the2020 
Transformational Vision that are germane to this study. Based on these 
reviews and analyses, the article noted that irrespective of the perspective that 
one deploys to assess the performance of ECOWAS in the last four decades, 
the goal of an integrated West Africa, accepted first in principle at Lagos in 
1975 is far from being achieved. However, this is not a given, but has been 
nurtured by legions of factors and forces, the chief one being West African 
statesmen’ aversion for any arrangement that would supplant the existing 
state structures because of the almost limitless opportunities they offer them 
in the capital accumulation sector. In the light of these, the article argues that 
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as long as the structures that, in the last four decades, have worked to frustrate 
the ECOWAS’ goal of an integrated community are still alive and active, the 
2020 Transformational Vision, though an ambitious agenda, going by the 
philosophical ideas undergirding it, like similar ideas and visions, of the 
distant and recent past, is likely to be unrealizable. Perhaps, it is another 
‘development tokenism’ by the sub-region’s statesmen and policy makers to 
appease radical voices in the sub-region. 
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